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1. Introduction  
The 2014 Euromaidan, perhaps justifiably, is often seen as one of the most dramatic events in 
Ukraine’s modern history, which marked a new chapter in Ukraine’s social, political and economic 
development. The so called Revolution of Dignity, which resulted in the fall of the authoritarian and 
notoriously corrupt regime of former President Victor Yanukovych, has become a symbol of the 
triumph of civic activism over repression and state dominance in Ukraine and beyond. Despite the 
exponential growth of civic activities since 2014, four years after the Euromaidan, it is unclear 
whether the Ukrainian people’s capacity for protest mobilisation has successfully been channelled 
into sustained, formal and productive forms of civic participation in the political life of the nation.   
1.1. Research objectives  
This study sets out to examine whether civil society organisations (CSOs) have become more 
integrated into the Ukrainian public policy-making process since the Euromaidan in 2014 and 
whether the Revolution has led to a meaningful shift towards a more inclusive style of governance. 
Through a focus on the anti-corruption policy field as a case study, the argument which will be 
advanced is that the 2014 Euromaidan did lead to a qualitative opening of the political system and 
the policy-making process in stark contrast to the authoritarian and exclusionist nature of the 
former Yanukovych regime. The post-2014 period has therefore seen considerable involvement of 
CSO representatives in public policy-making and a sustained formal commitment to dialogue on the 
part of many representatives of the authorities. More recently, however, a trend towards de facto 
marginalisation of CSO representatives and the closing of previously productive channels for 
cooperation suggest a moderate reversal of initial positive tendencies and raise questions about 
the extent to which the positive developments of 2014 and 2015 can be treated unambiguously as 
a sign of a large-scale and sustainable shift towards participatory governance.  
This argument will be developed through a detailed analysis of civil society’s advocacy activities and 
of the public policy-making process seeking to answer the following research sub-questions:  
1. What steps has the state made to secure CSO involvement in public policy-making?  
2. How effective have mechanisms been in actually involving CSO representatives in a 
sustainable manner?  
3. How (if at all) has state-CSO cooperation in policy-making evolved since 2014?   
4. How does the current state of cooperation compare to the pre-2014 relations between the 
state and civil society actors? 
1.2. Research scope and definitions  
In order to examine the Ukrainian authorities’ degree of openness to cooperation with non-state 
actors in public governance, the thesis focuses exclusively on the field of anti-corruption policy-
making in the period since 2014.  The focus on the post-2014 period is seen as a natural departure 
point for the study considering the dramatic effect that the Euromaidan had on the political 
landscape in Ukraine as well as in the dynamics of civic activity.  The strategy of focusing on a single 
policy field as the focal point of the study has been chosen due to practical reasons as the scope of 
a Master’s thesis does not allow for a fully comprehensive overview of CSO involvement of all fields 
of public policy-making. The anti-corruption sector in particular has been selected as a case study 
as it has been one of the areas in which demand for public involvement has been the greatest since 
2014, resulting in an explosion in civic activity and the growth of a significant number of 
organisations with high level of professionalism attempting to get involved in the anti-corruption 
reform process. In addition, considering the significant attention devoted to this topic and the 
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international and domestic pressure on the Ukrainian authorities to open up the anti-corruption 
reform process to civil society, the developments in this field are expected to provide a reliable 
indication of wider trends in the state’s commitment to cooperation with civil society 
representatives in public policy.  
While this study does not reject the broad definition of civil society as “the realm of organized social 
life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the 
state, [and] that is bound by a legal order or a set of shared collective rules” (Diamond 1999: 21), it 
will adopt a narrower definition, which has been deemed more suitable and operational. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the notion of civil society will be used to refer explicitly to the registered 
and professionalised civil society organisations (CSOs), operating in the anti-corruption field on the 
national level and engaging in policy advocacy activities. Although it is recognised that such a 
narrow definition of civil society has its limitations and excludes a significant share of the civic 
space, it has been deemed appropriate by virtue of the expertise and professionalism of such 
organisations, which makes them the most obvious partner to the state in policy-making and an 
active participant in many forms of consultation. Furthermore, the focus on CSOs is justified due to 
these actors’ explicit commitment to entering into policy dialogue with the authorities and to 
influencing policy-making, which allows for the control of additional factors contributing to 
insufficient engagement such as lack of participatory culture or societal disinterest in the political 
process, which are well-known issues in the post-Soviet context and in Ukraine in particular (e.g. 
Puglisi 2015: 2). The focus specifically on organisations operating on the national level, although not 
without its limitations, is considered appropriate due to the higher level of professionalisation of 
national entities, on one hand, and the highly centralised nature of anti-corruption policy-making in 
Ukraine, on the other. Overall, while a focus on professional CSOs is certainly limiting, it is seen as 
indicative of the presence of general trends and institutional culture of engagement.  
In addition, within the study the notion of openness of state authorities is understood in relation 
to participatory governance and public policy-making.  For this purpose, the broad definition of 
state openness as the extent to which authorities are “open to effective interaction with civil 
society and interest groups, and are able to take a variety of views and interests into consideration 
in the policy- and law-making processes” (OSCE 2007: 2) has been adopted.  
1.3. Significance of the topic  
The main aim of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on participatory governance as well as 
to the literature studying the influence of civil society in the fight against corruption. While situating 
itself within these existing bodies of literature, this thesis will seek to address a notable deficiency 
of empirical studies in the field of civil society advocacy, which has been characterised by a 
significant emphasis on theoretical conceptualisation and hypothesis-building. A better 
understanding of the empirical dimensions of state-CSO relations and cooperation would provide 
a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of civic participation with a distinct practical 
focus. Furthermore, the topic’s exploration within the post-Soviet context and Ukraine in particular 
would provide useful insight into the operation of CSOs in volatile and post-revolutionary 
environments. 
In addition, when it comes to the case study of post-2014 Ukraine in particular, this thesis aims to 
address a deficit of academic work examining in detail the relationship between state authorities 
and CSOs and civic participation in policy-making more generally. This is seen as beneficial as it 
would put to a test previously scarcely scrutinised although wide-spread perceptions that since 
2014 a much more open and democratic policy process, in which civil society plays a central role, 
has been established in Ukraine. 
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1.4. Structure   
The first part of this thesis offers an overview of the state of the academic literature dealing with 
participatory governance and especially with the role of CSOs in the process of public policy 
development. Afterwards, departing from the literature’s assumptions and limitations, the 
conceptual framework, developed for the purposes of the analysis, is presented along with a brief 
discussion of the methodology of data collection as well as of the limitations of the study. 
The subsequent parts of the thesis represent the substantial empirical aspect of the analysis. It 
begins with a short historical overview of state-CSO relations in the period since Ukraine’s 
independence before moving on to examine in detail the current state and nature of the 
cooperation between state authorities and CSO representatives in Ukraine. As demanded by the 
study’s analytical framework, chapters 5, 6 and 7 look in turn at the nature of public policy-making, 
paying particular attention to transparency and clarity of the process, at the legislative framework 
for engagement of CSO representatives in policy-making and at the degree of institutionalisation 
of participatory policy-making in practice.  
Finally, the study’s final chapter offers a brief overview of the main findings, summarises the 
argument and identifies potential topics that merit further academic attention and exploration.  
 
 
  
5 
 
2. Literature Review 
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, it is necessary to look at the current state of the 
literature dealing with the broad issue of state-civil society relations and cooperation, especially in 
the realm of public policy-making.  
2.1. The shift from government to governance  
Overall, the origins of the body of literature dealing with state-civil society cooperation on policy-
making can be traced back to discussions of the so-called shift from government to governance, 
believed to be taking place worldwide ever since the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Rhodes 1996; Peters 
and Pierre 1998, 2000; Heere 2004; Bonnafous-Boucher 2005; Kitthannan 2006; Bellamy and 
Palumbo 2010). The outcome of this transition can most broadly be defined as the replacement of 
traditional state-dominated, highly centralised and content-oriented approaches to public policy-
making, based on the principles of sovereignty, with a more open and inclusive style, which tends 
to be characterised by a much higher degree of external participation, a process orientation and 
the involvement of a broad spectrum of non-state actors at most stages of public policy-making 
(Edelenbos 1999: 570; Singh 2014: 4; Lievens 2015: 2; Džatková 2016: 377). This shift has traditionally 
been understood in the context of the emergence of increasingly complex societal environments. 
These complex societies pose new challenges to traditional state structures, creating an issue of 
governability for the state, which ceases to be able to exercise complete control over public realms 
it had previously dominated, forcing it to engage in a "process of co-regulation" as an adaptation 
mechanism (Willke 1991).  This “overstretching” of state capacities necessitates the “broader 
participation in the overall management of the state” (Hughes 2005: 88) and in the process of 
policy-making, policy implementation and service delivery of new and predominantly non-state 
actors (Giugni and Passy 1998: 81-82).  
Although this perceived shift from government to governance has taken a central place in political 
science discussions, it has not been without its critics. Some have challenged the extent of the 
applicability of the paradigm, arguing that its relevance is much more limited than the literature 
often suggests. In fact, according to Ralchev (2004: 328) amongst others, such a shift has not really 
taken place in less democratic contexts, where policy-making remains firmly the prerogative of the 
state, and the paradigm is much more applicable in the context of liberal democracies such as the 
ones found in much of the developed world. Such arguments, on the other hand, while certainly 
not baseless, have been countered by authors highlighting the relevance of such criticism even in 
the context of established democracies in relation to the deepening democratic deficit (Gaventa 
2004). Going even further in their criticism, others have challenged the genuine utility of the 
concept of governance and argued that such a significant shift does not seem to have taken place 
as expected even in highly democratic states such as Switzerland (Koch 2013).   
Despite the ongoing debates, however, with the help of such observations a general consensus 
seems to have emerged linking increasing levels of democratisation with a greater shift towards 
governance (Ghaus-Pasha 2004: 17; Hughes 2005: 89; Tătar 2006: 21). In this context, the transition 
to governance has come to be seen as a normatively positive phenomenon, which leads to the 
gradual opening of the political system and decision-making structures to new voices and actors, 
thus enhancing accountability and public oversight and bringing policy-making closer to popular 
needs and demands (Hughes 2005: 88; European External Action Service 2009: 11). Beyond this, 
more participatory policy-making is associated with other benefits such as better informed and 
higher quality policies and general enhancement of state capacities (Rietbergen-McCracken 2009: 
6; Gerard 2015: 368). 
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2.2. The role of civil society in public policy-making 
In addition to generating lively debate amongst scholars, donors and practitioners, the shift from 
government to governance has led to a resurge of interest in the role of civil society organisations 
(CSOs) in this emerging participatory policy-making model (Evers 1990, Kjaer 2004). CSOs have 
been seen as the actors with the greatest potential for benefiting from this new-found institutional 
openness and their achievements in this field have been widely studied. The main reason for this 
has been their perceived role as a link between the state and  wider society (Ralchev 2004: 327; Rek 
2005: 67). The subject of civil society engagement and state-CSO interaction has been studied 
primarily in the context of the development literature and poverty reduction policy-making (e.g. 
Karl 2002; Start and Hovland 2007), although the central role of civil society in the fight against 
corruption has also been widely recognised ever since the 1990s (e.g. Khan 1998; Buckland 2007; 
Schmidt 2007: 208; Chene and Dell 2008; Sadiku 2010: 36; Kalikh 2015). In any case, the strong link 
between corruption and poverty as well as other development issues provides a solid basis for 
utilisation of this literature in the context of anti-corruption policy-making as well. Therefore, 
despite the apparently narrow focus of the available literature, a number of general trends can be 
identified and applied in broader analysis of the patterns of state-CSOs cooperation and 
participatory public policy-making.  
Within the relatively sizeable body of literature exploring public policy-making and the role of civil 
society in this process, two general strands can be identified. These include scholarship, which 
explores the practical dimensions of state-CSO interaction, on one hand, and literature, which 
focuses on the environmental factors facilitating better state-CSO interaction, on the other. The 
first strand has largely been preoccupied with the issue of institutional openness, which has broadly 
been understood as the extent to which the government is ready to cooperate with civil society in 
an open and effective manner for the development of public policies (OSCE 2007: 2). Departing 
from this definition, a number of notable attempts have been made to identify and define the 
various mechanisms and tools of participatory policy-making such as open consultations, public 
hearings, formation of public councils, specialised meetings, round tables and others (e.g. Covey 
1994; Rietbergen-McCracken 2009; Gerard 2014: 378; Margaryan and Hakobyan 2014: 5-6). 
In addition to such descriptive accounts, a number of authors have sought to gain a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of the process of participatory policy-making. As a result, a rich 
collection of works offering various models for conceptualisation and categorisation of the 
relationship between governments and CSOs has emerged (e.g. Coston 1998; Guigy and Passy 1998: 
86; Thampi and Balakrishnan 2002; Jayasuriy and Rodan 2007; European External Action Service 
2009: 7). The vast majority of these focus on the degree of openness of the authorities towards 
CSOs' input and the extent of CSO incorporation into decision-making structures. The reason for 
this is the recognition of the inherently unequal dynamics of political dialogue, which is biased 
towards dominance by the state (Guigni and Passy 1998: 84).  
Efforts to apply these frameworks into empirical case studies in various contexts, however, have 
identified a number of patterns and phenomena that could emerge during the practical process of 
state-civil society cooperation. Perhaps the most important one of these is the danger of reluctant 
governments engaging in "tokenistic dialogue" (Spicer et al. 2011: 1754) or "illusory tripartism" (Ost 
2000: 530). This refers to a compensatory strategy pursued by reluctant governments, which might 
set up channels for dialogue for reasons such as donor pressure or legitimisation needs but use 
them merely as a front for perpetual exclusion and marginalisation of civil society actors (Gerard 
2015: 365). This can be achieved through a number of strategies including the decoupling of 
deliberative procedures from actual decision-making, which ensures that the state will remain 
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firmly in charge of the policy-making process (Bozzini and Fella 2008: 254). Such opening of the 
political process in name alone is said to be particularly common in hybrid regimes, where 
authorities are unwilling to risk genuine contestation and thus aim to set "permissible boundaries 
of conflict" (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 774). Similar tensions between institutional realities and 
objective realities of participation are also found in generally weaker democratic systems with 
limited culture of deliberation (Ohemeng 2015: 667). Post-communist and post-Soviet societies 
have received particular attention in this context as a good illustration of so called "hourglass 
societies" in which civil society and the population at large tend to remain firmly outside of all 
meaningful decision-making structures (Bowser 2001: 15).  
2.3. Determinants of success 
Increasing awareness of the vastly differing track record of various political systems and regimes 
with the implementation of participatory governance mechanisms, has led to the development of 
a body of literature dedicated specifically to exploring the issue of success and failure of civil society 
incorporation into policy-making. The aim of this literature has been to identify the factors, which 
can facilitate or obstruct state-civil society cooperation in decision-making and the successful 
development of governance structures.  
In this context, two broad groups of factors associated with higher or lower degree of participatory 
policy-making can be identified, namely internal and external factors. Internal factors refer to the 
capacities of CSOs themselves to engage in political dialogue productively. In this context, issues 
such as the need for sufficient level of expertise, professionalism and leadership have been 
highlighted along with the presence of managerial and other operational skills, which are necessary 
for the effective work of these organisations (UNRISD 2000: 7; Risley 2004: 4; Bozzini and Fella 
2008: 250). Capacities to produce high-quality research, generate knowledge and appeal to 
symbols and powerful actors effectively can also influence the extent of CSOs' involvement in a 
political dialogue (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, higher degree of cooperation amongst 
CSOs themselves and successful coalitions are said to be much more effective in engaging 
authorities in productive political dialogue (Margaryan and Hakobyan 2014: 6).  
While CSOs’ capabilities are undoubtedly important as a precondition for their participation in the 
public policy-making process, civic capacities do not necessarily translate into improved political 
dialogue. Therefore, the role of external factors in facilitating or obstructing institutional openness 
and the establishment of participatory policy-making structures have received significant attention 
in the literature. A general consensus has emerged pointing at the decisive role of an "enabling 
environment" (European External Action Service 2009: 6) or, in other words, the presence of 
favourable political, economic and societal conditions in determining the likelihood of policy-
making dialogue (Grugel 1999; Pollard and Court 2005: vi; Court et al. 2006: iv; Fioranmonti and 
Heinrich 2007: 9; Spicer et al. 2011: 1748; Silpakar 2012: 4). Here it is important to note that the 
majority of scholarship recognises the dynamism of political environments. The potential of 
changes of governments or shifts in the social and economic conditions to trigger an opening or 
closing of the system is well acknowledged (Bozzini and Fella 2008: 245). Such an understanding 
corresponds closely with the concept of "political opportunity" utilised in the literature studying 
social movements and mobilisation (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Accordingly, in this context political 
opportunity is understood as an environmental change in the political, economic and/or societal 
status quo, which provides a more favourable environment for the development of more or less 
open policy-making process and more or less functional state-society relations. Such assumptions 
have underlined the choice of the Euromaidan as the focus of this study as well.  
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The dynamism of the system notwithstanding, a number of environmental conditions conducive to 
the development of a more inclusive public policy-making style can be identified. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, going back to the link between state-civil society dialogue and democratisation 
processes, history of authoritarian rule and state domination are said to be considerable obstacles 
to dialogue and involvement of external actors, including CSOs (Ghaus-Pasha 2007: 210; Ohemeng 
2015: 667). This has been particularly relevant to the post-Soviet context, where history of 
totalitarianism is said to have translated into a weak culture of deliberation and limited state-CSO 
interaction (e.g. Ash et al. 2017: 61). On the contrary, more democratic regimes, characterised by 
higher levels of political contestation, respect for the rule of law, basic provisions for accountability 
and transparency as well as greater political freedoms tend to be much more willing to share 
decision-making powers with CSOs (Pollard and Court 2005: vi; Court et al. 2006: 13; Silpakar 2012: 
4). Within these broadly facilitating environments, however, issues such as wide spread corruption 
and clientelism can significantly reduce governments' willingness to enter into a meaningful 
dialogue with CSO representatives (Carothers 2005; Kornsweg et al. 2006: 8; Lutsevych 2013: 1). 
Equality, closed institutional and legislative environments, characterised by high level of 
institutional centralisation often experience a low degree of institutional openness (Ghaus-Pasha 
2007: 215; Fioranmonti and Heinrich 2007: 18; OSCE 2007: 2) 
Such institutional and systemic conditions, however, while important as determinants, can be 
mitigated. In this respect, the role of donors has received considerable attention with many 
scholars highlighting the potential of external pressure in compelling authorities to open up 
decision-making to the input of civil society (Fiaramonti and Heinrich 2007: 7; Margaryan and 
Hakobyan 2014: 49). As noted earlier, reluctant regimes can pursue compensatory strategies 
allowing them to avoid meaningful dialogue behind a facade of engagement (Sadiku 2010: 52). 
Despite this, arguments based on the positive role of donors in promoting inclusive policy-making 
gained particular prominence in the context of rapidly expanding Europeanisation literature. 
Departing from observations about the growing influence of CSOs as a source of policy advice with 
the EU itself (Rek 2005: 67), authors such as Bozzini and Fella (2008: 257) have seen the 
"Europeanisation" of policy areas specifically as a path towards a considerable opening of decision-
making in the respective field.  
In addition to purely systemic factors, some more pragmatic considerations are often said to 
influence the willingness of state authorities to engage civil society actors in public policy-making. 
These include, before all, existing governmental capacities and degree of salience and sensitivity of 
the issue or policy area in question. Policy dialogue and CSO incorporation into decision-making is 
said to occasionally result from insufficient expertise or capacity of state authorities to tackle 
certain issues (Karl 2002; Bozzini and Fella 2008: 245). A more important determinant, however, 
seems to be policy salience. Sensitive policy areas, changes in which might challenge powerful 
interests, are expected to see significantly less CSO input, while low political and economic costs 
can push governments towards more openness (Pollard and Court 2005: iv; Margaryan and 
Hakobyan 2014: 37). Interestingly, this logic has been challenged by authors, who have argued that 
even in highly visible and salient policy areas governments could seek to include CSOs as a way for 
sharing responsibility for riskier policy options (Bozzini and Fella 2008: 245). Public pressure when 
it comes to highly visible policies of particular importance to the population is also an important 
factor that might facilitate openness in the right conditions.  
The basic assumptions and hypotheses identified in this chapter will form the basis of the 
conceptual framework for analysis and interpretation, which will be presented in the following 
chapter and will be employed as the basis of the analysis in the remaining part of this thesis.  In this 
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sense, the empirical analysis will seek to test the validity and applicability of the assumptions 
identified in the literature in an attempt to evaluate the extent of openness of the Ukrainian 
political system and public policy process to CSO input in the field of anti-corruption policy-making 
in the aftermath of the 2014 Euromaidan. While as acknowledged earlier, those assumptions have 
largely been produced in the context of the development field and are thus rarely focusing on the 
post-Soviet space as such, parallels and reasonable generalisations are deemed appropriate by 
virtue of the fundamental similarities in nature between development policies, aimed at reducing 
poverty and improving popular wellbeing, and anti-corruption policies, which are characterised by 
a similar focus on the public good.    
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3. Analytical Framework and Methodology  
In order to evaluate the degree of openness of the Ukrainian political system in the aftermath of 
the Euromaidan, a framework for analysis incorporating key indicators of state-CSO relations is 
necessary. These indicators have been chosen largely based on the information provided by the 
literature review as well as existing models seeking to explain the dynamics of state-civil society 
relations. The framework, which will be presented here, has been informed by the classic Coston 
model of government-NGO relations (Coston 1998), by the levels of participation spectrum used by 
the European External Action Centre in its guidelines for "Code of Good Practice for Civil 
Participation" (EEAS 2009) as well as, to a lesser extent, by the "continuum of participation" 
developed by Karl (2002).  
While the main assumptions and the structure of these models have been used as a departure 
point, the framework has been adjusted in order to fit the needs of the present study as well as to 
incorporate indicators, which are particularly relevant to the Ukrainian context and the topic of 
anti-corruption.  For example, the current framework will preserve the attention to the mode and 
specificity of existing forms of dialogue (Karl 2002, EEAS 2009) as well as the consideration of 
particular dynamics of power asymmetry between government and non-state actors within them 
(Coston 1998). On the other hand, it will seek to address limitations such as the fact that those 
models fail to take into account advocacy-oriented NGO activities (Coston 1998) and wider systemic 
issues, which might facilitate or obstruct CSOs' input (Karl 2002).  At the same time, it has sought 
to mimic Coston’s macro-level approach, which allows for an account of the existing systemic 
conditions and environment, as opposed to the more limited scale of other models focusing on a 
narrower set of indicators.  
In addition, the present model incorporates indicators considering the transparency of the 
decision-making process as well as the de facto respect for existing legal provisions for 
engagement and the degree of formalisation of dialogue as a sign of genuine commitment. These 
adjustments have been made due to fact that although the risks of "mimicing" have been widely 
acknowledged in the literature, especially in less democratic and very corrupt environments such 
as the one found in Ukraine (Lutsevych 2013: 10), this issue has largely been overlooked by past 
academic conceptualisations.  Given the focus of this thesis on the post-Soviet space and the anti-
corruption field in particular, these modifications are seen as highly relevant.  
3.1. Evaluation indicators   
As a result of the abovementioned considerations, a model consisting of six ideal-type categories 
describing state-CSO relations has been constructed. Each of the six categorisations corresponds 
to the political system’s performance according to three key indicators, namely the degree of clarity 
and predictability of the decision-making process, the nature of the existing legal framework for 
engagement of CSOs in decision-making and the extent to which dialogue has been formalised and 
institutionalised in practice.   
Clarity and transparency of the decision-making process 
This indicator has been chosen due to the importance of institutional transparency as a facilitating 
factor for effective CSO advocacy and public scrutiny of political activity more generally (Bukenya 
et al. 2012: 27; Bhargva 2015: 5). It is, however, recognised that transparency is a necessary though 
not sufficient condition for institutional openness to CSO input and effective state-CSO political 
dialogue (Marin 2016: 2).  
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With this in mind, the indicator has been operationalised through the introduction of a number of 
sub-indicators, whose purpose is to ease practical applicability of the theoretical framework. These 
include dimensions of the decision-making process such as the availability of well-established and 
predictable legislative procedures, information about which is publicly available and reliable. In 
addition, content-related sub-indicators such as the degree of transparency of the policy-making 
agenda will be considered. This refers, before all, to the standard of transparency of state activities 
relating to the provision to the wider public of timely information about policies, amendments and 
legislative plans, which are to be considered by state authorities, in order to allow for appropriate 
response on the part of CSOs.   
Nature of the legal framework for engagement  
This indicator refers primarily to the degree of comprehensiveness of the existing legislative 
framework for dialogue with non-state actors and was chosen based on the presumption that 
broader and more sophisticated legal framework for engagement is likely to be present in more 
open political systems. In this sense, extensive legal guarantees for civic participation are seen as a 
good indication of the state’s commitment to incorporating CSOs in the public policy process. In 
order for this indicator to be operationalised, the analysis will look at the existing legislation 
mandating mechanisms for public inclusion in decision-making with special attention being paid to 
the asymmetrical power relations underlying those mechanisms. In addition, in order to control for 
the issue of irrelevance of consultations to the actual policy-making process, which has been 
identified as a common obstacle to the genuine participation of CSO representatives (Bozzini and 
Fella 2008: 254), the analysis will consider whether the law provides for public governance 
mechanisms, which are binding or mandatory in the framework of public policy-making or are in 
other ways meaningfully incorporated into the substantive decision-making process.  
Degree of institutionalisation of dialogue  
Finally, this indicator is crucial to the analysis and focuses on the more practical dimensions of state-
CSO relations as manifested in the specific context under examination. It seeks to explore the 
practice of policy dialogue beyond the existing legal framework and has been incorporated as it is 
recognised that legislation, while indicative of a state’s official commitment to dialogue, rarely 
represents an exhaustive or completely accurate list of the de facto practice of participatory policy-
making. In fact, this indicator is particularly relevant to the study of less democratic and hybrid 
regimes, such as those to be found in the post-Soviet space, where tokenistic as opposed to 
genuine engagement as well as a more general trend towards decoupling of the existing legal 
framework from real-life practices and the prevalence of informal practices over formally 
established procedures are well-recognised (Fiaramonti & Heinrich 2007: 29; Shevchenko 2017). 
For the purposes of the analysis, the indicator has been operationalised through the introduction 
of two broad sub-indicators – de facto respect for the legal framework for CSO participation (if any) 
and the degree of institutionalisation of state-CSO dialogue. In this context, the notion of 
institutionalisation is understood as the presence of formal rules and regulations, which guarantee 
formal, consistent and reliable channels for inclusion and state responsiveness to CSO input 
regardless of contextual and other subjective factors such as leadership preferences, political will 
and informal relationships. In order to establish the extent to which state-CSO relations in Ukraine 
have been governed by norms, the analysis will draw heavily on the experience and perceptions of 
CSO practitioners involved in policy advocacy in the anti-corruption field.  
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3.2. Spectrum of state-CSO relations  
Based on the degree of institutional openness and receptiveness according to each of the 
indicators, the following spectrum of six ideal-type categories describing state-CSO relations and 
the degree of state openness to policy dialogue has been developed. Each of these relationship 
types can be briefly summarised as follows:  
 
 
Repression 
Repression represents the most limited form of political openness to CSO input. In fact, this 
relationship is likely to be present in environments highly hostile to civil society in general, where 
dialogue might be altogether absent and CSOs might even be facing repression by the state or 
prosecution. In these conditions, political process is largely closed to the public, lacks even basic 
principles of transparency and policy decisions are arbitrary and largely dependent on elite 
consensus. There are no meaningful institutionalised forms of engagement, while informal 
 
 
CLARITY & TRANSPARENCY OF 
DECISION-MAKING 
 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ENGAGEMENT 
DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONALISATION  
(IN PRACTICE) 
REPRESSION 
 
Lack of transparency, 
unpredictable, arbitrary policy-
making 
 
No formal or informal 
mechanisms for dialogue exist 
No institutionalised forms of dialogue 
No CSO influence on policy 
TOLERATION 
 
Basic transparency guarantees 
No clarity about agenda content 
and details 
 
Very limited legal provisions for 
state-CSO communication 
(sporadic and outside of official 
policy-making) 
 
Very few (if any) formal platforms for 
dialogue, which function poorly 
Very limited real CSO influence on 
policy 
 
STATE-
CONTROLLED 
ENGAGEMENT 
 
Relative transparency through 
process could be unpredictable at 
times 
 
Limited although present legal 
framework for dialogue (non-
binding and non-mandatory) 
 
Some degree of formalisation exists 
although in practice effectiveness 
varies considerably  
Limited and very selective state 
responsiveness to input  
  
LIMITED DIALOGUE 
 
Clear and predictable policy-
making process and policy 
agenda 
CSO influence on agenda is 
limited 
 
Key legal provisions for 
dialogue but framework is 
imperfect 
 
Reliable and functioning 
institutionalised channels for 
consultation exist  
Subjective factors determine degree 
of responsiveness  
COLLABORATION 
 
Clear and predictable policy-
making process 
Commitment to transparency 
Some CSO influence on policy 
agenda 
 
Extensive legal framework for 
engagement throughout the 
decision-making process 
Limitations only in highly 
sensitive fields 
 
Relatively high level of 
institutionalisation 
Formal mechanisms are reliable  
Considerable degree of 
responsiveness in most policy fields  
 
PARTNERSHIP 
 
Clear and predictable policy-
making process 
CSOs contribute to the shaping of 
political agenda 
 
Comprehensive legal 
framework and commitment to 
dialogue at all stages of policy-
making 
Sanctions for non-compliance 
 
High degree of institutionalisation 
Formal mechanisms are reliable and 
predictable 
 State authorities are highly 
responsive to CSO input  
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channels of communication, even if existent, are severely limited. CSOs have virtually no influence 
on policy-making.  
Toleration 
Toleration is a milder form of state-CSO relations, which, however, remains largely closed to 
meaningful civic input. While there is basic understanding of the decision-making process amongst 
the public and basic information about political agenda might be available, this is normally limited 
to themes and details about legal content or planned legislative activities are not widely circulated 
prior to their announcement. Some though very limited legal commitment to state-CSO 
communication and consultation might exist but framework provides for mostly sporadic and non-
binding forms of dialogue with little or no direct relevance to the formal decision-making process. 
Civic input is often limited to voluntary opinion-sharing in the form of statements or open letters, 
whose main aim is to increase the visibility of public opinion and not to directly influence policy 
content. Any dialogue that might exist is almost completely a result of informal relations and not a 
clear institutionalised commitment. CSOs have minimal policy influence in practice.   
State-controlled engagement 
This relationship type is based on the clear distinction between engagement, which is seen as one-
sided transaction of information largely dominated by the government, and dialogue, which is likely 
to emerge in more advanced stages of state-CSO cooperation and implies an active two-way 
exchange with the participation of both parties.  
In this category, decision-making is relatively clear and predictable and civil society is aware of the 
key issues on the policy-making agenda, which is, however, largely a result of informal channels of 
communications and not of high standards of governmental transparency. Some limited legal 
provisions for CSO engagement exist, although they tend to be non-binding, ad hoc and their use 
is often subject to the discretion of public authorities. Legal framework might foresee forms of civic 
inclusion but they are limited to information-sharing implying a one-way flow of information from 
public authorities to CSOs. Non-compliance with legal provisions for participation is not uncommon 
and is largely not sanctioned.  Some although very low degree of institutionalisation of dialogue is 
present but formal mechanisms often function poorly. Responsiveness to CSO input is limited and 
tends to be highly selective.  
Limited dialogue 
Limited dialogue is the first relationship type in which meaningful receptiveness to CSO input and 
participation can be observed. Such contexts are characterised by high levels of institutional 
transparency. Decision-making process is clear and predictable, civil society has a thorough 
understanding of the policy-making agenda and access to information, which allows it to effectively 
monitor governmental activity. Civil society actors, however, are very limited in their ability to 
actively shape policy agenda. There is a limited institutional framework for dialogue, which 
guarantees basic principles of civic participation but those are largely non-binding and are not part 
of the official decision-making cycle. Some key legal provisions are missing. Some reliable channels 
of formal dialogue are present although informal mechanisms and personal connections are still 
central to determining their performance and the degree of state responsiveness. Although, 
selectivity is common in the state’s dialogue with CSO representatives, civil society can be said to 
exercise a reasonable influence on policy outcomes in certain cases.  
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Collaboration 
Collaborative relations are characterised by transparent and predictable decision-making 
procedures and a conscious effort on the part of authorities to publicise detailed information about 
policy agenda through official channels of communication to the public. Civil society actors might 
even exercise some, although not necessarily direct, influence on the policy agenda. There is a 
sufficiently extensive institutional and legal framework, guaranteeing civic participation in the 
political process. Limitations are likely to be present only when it comes to particularly sensitive 
issues and policy areas. Most mechanisms for state-CSO interaction are formalised, while 
institutionalised channels are reliable and governed by official practice in the majority of cases. 
CSOs exercise a meaningful influence on policy outcomes, which is consistent across most policy 
fields.  
Partnership  
Finally, partnership represents the highest degree of political openness to CSO participation in 
policy-making. In the conditions of partnership, the policy-making process is clear, predictable and 
well-established and civil society is not only aware of the policy-making agenda but is often actively 
engaged in shaping it. There is a highly institutionalised and well-established legal framework 
providing for extensive participation of civil society at all stages of decision-making as well as for 
clear sanctions for those who disregard these provisions. Formal mechanisms of de facto co-
decision making are the most common form of interaction across various policy fields. State-CSO 
dialogue is almost entirely formalised within structures, characterised by equal power relations, 
which have considerable influence on policy outcomes.  
3.3. A note on methodology 
This model will provide the basis of the empirical analysis of the thesis. However, it is recognised 
that it represents an ideal-type conceptualisation meaning that real-world political systems and 
state-society relations are unlikely to fit any of the identified categories perfectly. The relatively 
fluid nature of the categories themselves also naturally means that any evaluation according to the 
spectrum would represent an inherently interpretative exercise and cannot be considered a precise 
and clear-cut process. In this sense, the present conceptualisation and the process of 
categorisation should be understood as an instrument for analysis aimed at identifying general 
trends in institutional openness as opposed to an exercise in precise regime definition.  
Furthermore, given the dynamism, complexity and volatility of political environments, a political 
system could in fact combine a number of aspects characteristic of the different relationships 
identified. Finally, it is also acknowledged that political regimes and governments are not always 
monolithic entities (Coston 1998: 363) and thus it is possible that the level of openness of various 
agencies and institutions might vary considerably across the same regime. Therefore, while a loose 
association could exist between the typologies presented and certain regime types, the 
performance of regimes or particular bodies according to the framework alone cannot be used as 
a reliable indicator of regime type.   
3.4. Sources and limitations of the study 
The findings of this thesis are based on extensive desk research, which has drawn on a range of 
primary sources including legislative texts, expert opinions, official statements and documentation 
produced by various relevant stakeholders as well as on secondary sources such as relevant 
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academic literature, performance reports and policy papers. All Russian- and Ukrainian language 
materials featured in this thesis have been translated by the author.   
In addition, 14 semi-structured interviews with representatives from Kyiv-based CSOs, operating on 
the national level and engaged in anti-corruption activity and policy advocacy, were carried out in 
early May 2018 in Kyiv. In the course of the interviews, activists were asked to elaborate on their 
own anti-corruption activities and their advocacy work especially. In addition, they were asked a 
number of open-ended questions inviting them to reflect on their perceptions of state-CSO 
cooperation, the degree of institutional openness to dialogue as well as on their own experience 
of cooperating with representatives of the state if any. Interviews were conducted in English and 
Russian language. A full list of interviewees’ affiliation is provided in the Appendix, however, within 
the thesis interview data has been anonymised and no interviewees have been identified by name.  
Interviewee selection was made based on the author's available network of contacts. While it is 
recognised that this might be a potential source of bias, the fact that Ukraine's CSO environment 
and especially the community of anti-corruption activists is characterised by high levels of cross-
organisational cooperation would suggest that the perceptions expressed by the interviewees are 
likely a result of collective experiences of the CSO sector and thus have a wider validity beyond the 
current sample. In addition, it is recognised that CSO representatives are stakeholders in the anti-
corruption policy process with interest linked to promoting the public good but also to securing 
funding and other forms of support based on their performance. While their potential partiality is 
acknowledged, a method of triangulation in data collection has been adopted in order to mitigate 
the risks, linked to overreliance on interviews alone as a source of information.  
Unfortunately, time-constraints as well as operational difficulties have prevented the author from 
interviewing representatives from the Ukrainian authorities, which would have provided an 
additional perspective, making the findings of the study even more complete. This limitation has in 
part been mitigated by the use of sources, which might allude to the official position of the 
authorities as expressed in official statements, action plans and legislation.  
It is recognised that the focus on the activities of national CSOs, while justified in this case by virtue 
of the centralised nature of anti-corruption policy making in Ukraine, might limit the validity of 
conclusions when it comes to state-CSO relations on the lower levels of governance. There are 
many reasons for that including limited capacities of local CSOs and lower costs for authorities in 
case of lack of engagement (Martyna-David 2016).   
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4. State-CSO Relations in Ukraine – A Historical Overview  
Before beginning with the substantial analysis of state-CSO relations and cooperation in post-
Euromaidan Ukraine, it is necessary to look at the topic in the wider context of Ukraine’s post-
Soviet political transition.   
Due to the repressive nature of the Soviet political system, at the outset of independence civil 
society in Ukraine was very weak (Stepanenko 2006: 583), a well-recognised post-communist 
legacy (Howard, 2003), which has impeded the process of establishing productive dialogue 
between the state and civil society throughout Ukraine’s post-Soviet history. This weakness has 
been further exasperated by what some have suggested is a wider problem of paternalistic political 
culture which is at odds with participatory governance (Ash et al. 2017: 61). As a result, CSOs and 
the wider population of Ukraine have traditionally been detached from the political process and 
have had a very limited influence on political outcomes, which has remained dominated and 
“monopolised” by traditional state structures and political elites (Kobeleva 2009: 34; Vakulenko et 
al. 2014: 5). What is more, the low trust in public institutions, another Soviet legacy, has meant that 
the state and civil society structures have largely been perceived as separate and even opposing 
entities making the concept of political dialogue irrelevant (Ash et al. 2017: 60). The peculiarities of 
the Soviet experience contributed to a notably confrontational and hostile relationship between 
CSOs and public institutions in the early years of independence, when the prevailing opinion was 
that civil society’s role was to act as a challenger of state authority (Ghosh 2014: 2; Fedorovich 2004: 
277). 
The development of productive state-CSO dialogue in Ukraine has also been impeded by limited 
capacities of the vast majority of organisations in the post-Soviet period.  This has largely resulted 
from insufficient expertise, overreliance on external support and funding as well as weak 
constituent base in Ukrainian society (Lutsevych 2013: 4), all of which have traditionally limited the 
sustainability of CSOs in Ukraine and their viability as stakeholders in the public policy process. The 
weakness of the organised CSO sector in Ukraine is well-exemplified by the fact that according to 
some estimates, prior to 2014 only about 10% of registered NGOs were actually active and 
performed any meaningful activity (Bierman et al. 2014: 4). The pattern of civic exclusion and lack 
of sufficient political dialogue failed to be reversed even after the Orange Revolution of 2004, 
which saw an exponential growth of civic activity and protest. The large-scale popular mobilisation 
during and shortly after the Revolution, however, did not translate into the establishment of 
sustainable civic structures or effective mechanisms for inclusive governance leading to a quick 
backsliding into earlier exclusive practices (Steward 2009: 190).  
4.1. The Yanukovych regime (2010-2014) 
While state-CSO relations in post-Soviet Ukraine as a whole have been characterised by persistent 
patterns of state domination and relative exclusion of CSOs from the policy- and decision-making 
processes, the term of President Victor Yanukovych saw further deterioration of the environment 
for state-CSO cooperation and considerable marginalisation of CSOs in the Ukrainian political 
system (Kobets and Ruda 2014: 14). Despite continued proclamations of commitment to dialogue 
and civic inclusion (Lutsevych 2012: 10) as well as a number of apparently positive legislative 
developments such as the overhaul of the public council system (USAID 2016: 250) and the adoption 
of the “Strategy of State Policy for Promoting the Development of Civil Society in Ukraine” (Kobets 
and Ruda 2014: 29), a particularly non-transparent and closed system of decision-making was 
established in that period. In this context, existing legal and institutional provisions were sabotaged 
through measures ranging from blatant disregard of formal rules to “faking” of policy engagement 
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through the staffing of platforms for dialogue with representatives from alternative “civil society” 
structures, which were under governmental control and were used simply as a legitimising tool 
(European External Action Service 2014: 4). Non-compliance with legislative provisions and a 
generally dismissive attitude to policy input offered by CSO representatives were common and 
largely un-sanctioned (ibid.). More examples of particular corrupt practices undermining 
meaningful CSO participation will be given in the following empirical chapters, which will explore 
the change in governmental practice when it comes to political dialogue.  
Overall, a strictly formalistic and selective approach to engagement prevailed during the Presidency 
of Victor Yanukovych (Ghosh 2014: 3). In this increasingly authoritarian environment the vast 
majority of important policy decisions were made behind closed doors and there was a wide-spread 
belief in the irrelevance of civic bodies to the process of public policy-making. This resulted in 
significant unpredictability of the legislative process, which was well-demonstrated by the 
apparently effortless adoption by the Ukrainian Parliament of the so called “Dictatorship Laws” on 
16 January 2014 at the height of the clashes between protesters and the government and in 
violation of legislative and constitutional provisions and procedures (Kobets and Ruda 2014: 11).  
4.2. The Euromaidan – a turning point in Ukrainian civic development  
The repressive nature of the regime established by President Yanukovych as well as his 
administration’s refusal to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union led to an 
outburst of civic mobilisation and activism in the winter of 2013-2014, which has come to be known 
as Euromaidan. The lengthy and deadly standoff between protesters and the regime, which 
culminated with the flight of President Yanukovych from the country, has widely been regarded as 
a turning point for Ukrainian political development and a “watershed for Ukrainian civil society” 
(Worschech 2017: 23). The Revolution is believed to have brought a “qualitative change in social 
participation” towards a more organised and sustainable model, different from earlier isolated 
protest activism (Puglisi 2015:6).  More generally, the post-Euromaidan period has witnessed an 
increased popular demand for democratisation, widening of the public space and a public 
commitment to the establishment of a more participatory policy-making process, in which citizens 
have more opportunities for engagement (Ash et al. 2017: 59; Vakulenko et al. 2014: 10; Burlyuk et 
al. 2017: 3).  
In addition to the perceived general change in attitudes towards the role of civil society in the 
political system, the post-Euromaidan period has been associated with a number of concrete steps 
towards opening of the political space to increased CSO input. This process has been further aided 
by the entry of reform-minded activists and representatives of civil society in formal state 
structures including the Parliament, a number of Ministries, the government as well as various local 
governing bodies (McDonough 2017: 10). Although the presence of such figures in positions of 
power in principle is far from a guarantee for improved political dialogue, as demonstrated by 
similar developments in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution (Shapovalova 2010: 7), the 
revitalisation of public institutions has resulted in a number of positive developments in the field of 
state-CSO relations. Civil society organisations have assumed a leading position in the development 
and implementation of an array of reforms including the complete overhaul of the previously 
notoriously corrupt public procurement system and far-reaching reform programmes in the field of 
anti-corruption, decentralisation and law enforcement amongst others (Bulakh 2018: 5; Minakov 
and Rojanski 2015: 9; Sushko 2015: 1). Civil society activists and experts working in the framework 
of the civic coalition Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) as well as various other civic advocacy 
initiatives have apparently become increasingly integrated in the formal decision-making structures 
of the state through various new consultative bodies and participatory mechanisms.  
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In fact, the growth of CSOs and their influence in Ukrainian society and the political system in the 
post-Euromaidan period has been so significant that it has come to be seen by some as a potential 
threat to traditional state structures. Looking at the wide variety of functions and responsibilities 
in policy-making and service delivery, which civil society actors have assumed in light of the near-
complete state failure in 2014, Minakov (2015) amongst others has suggested that CSOs have come 
to play an “outsized role in Ukrainian politics”. This means that CSOs have increasingly established 
themselves as substitutes and not partners to the state (Prague Security Studies Institute 2017: 6).   
While these assumptions about increased state openness and the growth of the role of CSOs in 
political life have been based on general observations of the developments in Ukraine since 2014, 
they have not been scrutinised systematically in the academic literature to this point. The purpose 
of the remaining part of this thesis will be exactly to evaluate the real degree of state openness to 
political dialogue with representatives from organised civil society since 2014 as well as to identify 
any more particular patterns that would allow for a more detailed and nuanced evaluation of the 
state of cooperation. 
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5. Transparency of the Decision-Making Process 
As stipulated by the theoretical framework, the first aspect of the existing framework for dialogue 
which will be considered is the degree of transparency, clarity and predictability of the public policy 
process.  
5.1. Transparency and public access to information  
Basic legal provisions guaranteeing public access to information about legislative activities and 
government activities more generally are amongst the most important pre-conditions for the 
development of an open, clear and inclusive public policy-making (Bhargva 2012: 15).  At the most 
basic level, transparency and public access to information is guaranteed by Article 15 (prohibiting 
censorship) and Article 34 (guaranteeing freedom of information) of the Constitution of Ukraine 
(Constitution of Ukraine 1996). 
More particularly, Ukraine boasts a relatively comprehensive framework providing citizens with the 
right to public information through the Law on Access to Public Information (Law of Ukraine 2011), 
whose aim is to provide the basic framework for transparency of public authorities (Ministry of 
Information Policy of Ukraine 2017). Adopted in 2011, the law remains one of the few widely 
commended legislative developments, which took place during the term of President Viktor 
Yanukovych (Kobets and Ruda 2014: 15). It provides for a number of mechanisms and channels for 
public access to information relevant to the policy-making process. This includes access to legal 
acts, draft legislation, agendas of public meetings and a broad range of policy documents such as 
progress reports on the implementation of target programmes carried out by state authorities 
nationally and locally. Importantly, citizens requesting information are not required to provide 
justification for their request and authorities are obliged by law to provide a response within 5 
working days, a period which can be extended to 20 working days in exceptional cases. Citizens, 
who fail to receive the data they have requested, are entitled to appeal to the authorities or the 
Ombudsman. Limited exceptions from the law's provisions include information deemed as state 
secret or otherwise confidential and information and documentation designated exclusively for 
internal use. The legislation applies to all public institutions including the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches (UCL Constitutional Unit 2011).  
The current access to information legislation is widely accepted as comprehensive and sufficiently 
broad (Lovitt 2016a: 87). Such positive evaluations are well-exemplified by the good performance 
of Ukraine in the Global Right to Information Rating, a project whose aim is to evaluate the existing 
legal framework for public access to information in a range of countries across the world. According 
to the ranking, the Law on Access to Public Information is awarded 108 points out of a maximum 
of 150, placing it ahead of the majority of states under examination including most EU Member 
States (RTI Rating 2013). Despite such positive evaluations, however, it should be acknowledged 
that the de facto implementation of the Right to Information provisions is sometimes flawed and 
information is not always provided in a timely fashion and in the appropriate form (Kobets and 
Ruda 2014: 15) 
More recently, in the aftermath of the Euromaidan the legal framework for public access to 
information was considerably boosted by the adoption of the Law on Amendments to Some Laws 
of Ukraine on Access to Public Information in the Form of Open Data (Law of Ukraine 2015a). The 
new law effectively incorporated the open data principle into the provisions of the Law on Access 
to Public Information and a number of other relevant pieces of legislation. This means that state 
authorities, covered by the legislation, are obliged to provide open access to a large amount of 
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their data, including detailed information about their policy-making activities, eliminating the need 
for citizens to officially request information in order to access it. Such information must be made 
available free of charge on the individual websites of each institution as well as on a centralised 
open data online platform (www.data.gov.ua). (Lovitt 2016: 90) 
The development was seen as a notable step towards improving transparency of state activities in 
the country (United Nations Development Programme 2015). Despite some challenges in the 
implementation of the law and the actual utilisation of the open data (Talant 2018, Council of 
Europe 2017a) such hopes appear to have been justified considering the dramatic improvement of 
Ukraine's score in the Global Open Data Index, where the country boasts 31st place, well-ahead of a 
number of European states (Global Open Data Index 2018).  
Overall, all CSO activists interviewed for this thesis expressed sufficient satisfaction with the degree 
of state transparency and their access to policy-related information including texts of drafts, 
legislative projects and the authorities' policy-making agenda more generally. Despite quoting 
some exceptional legislative initiatives, which were said to have been characterised by relatively 
greater secrecy at their initial stages of development, such as the controversial draft project 
introducing e-declarations for anti-corruption activist (Interviewee 5), none of the interviewees 
expressed any concerns about the general level of clarity when it comes to the policy-making 
process and its content. This was the position even of activists, who otherwise sharply criticised 
the authorities for their lack of responsiveness to their suggestions and opinions expressed in 
relation to such information (Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 13 and 14).  
In addition to general access to information legislation, the interviewees identified a number of 
additional mechanisms for obtaining policy-relevant information, which facilitate their advocacy 
activities. These included a number of institutionalised consultative platforms, bringing together 
representatives of the state and civil society, which require regular information provision in the 
process of drafting, consultation and policy-development more generally. Although relevant, 
however, such formalised mechanisms will not be examined further here as an in-depth analysis 
will be offered in the following chapters focusing on the legal and institutional framework for 
engagement. Other information channels include informal forums and initiatives such as weekly 
discussions of the plenary policy agenda between representatives of the Parliamentary majority 
and CSO activists (USAID 2016: 250), regular participation in parliamentary committees working on 
relevant issues (Interviewees 2 and 6) as well as participation in legislative meetings and hearings, 
which are open to the public (Interviewee 14). Interviewees also gave examples of extensive 
monitoring initiatives of legislative activities such as the project initiated by the Anti-Corruption 
Action Centre for daily monitoring of parliamentary activity related to anti-corruption (Interviewee 
9). The presence and the alleged success of such initiatives as well as extensive investigative 
journalism, utilising publicly available information (Hart 2017; Council of Europe 2017a: 22) implies 
considerable access to information about the legislative process underway.  
Despite the relatively positive evaluation of general access to information, however, interviewees 
recognised the closing of some previously useful channels for communication. Examples include 
the de facto liquidation of early post-Euromaidan initiatives such as the informal Council of Anti-
Corruption Fighters, initiated by former Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Andriy Parubiy, which 
used to bring together MPs and CSO representatives in discussions of anti-corruption policy agenda 
and priorities (Interviewee 11). Furthermore, in the course of the interviews it was also suggested 
that there has been an increasing reluctance amongst some MPs to participate in informal forums 
for communication exchange with CSO representatives due to concerns that visible association 
with civil society actors might have negative reputational consequences (Interviewee 14). 
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Regardless, a number of interviewees pointed at the importance of informal political networks and 
connections within key law-making bodies to providing insights into the content of the policy-
making process and agenda (Interviewees 1, 4, 6 and 11). Overall, the present access to information 
was said to represent a considerable break with tradition, when compared to the information 
available during the regime of Viktor Yanukovych (Interviewees 2, 5, 7 and 10) when according to 
one interviewee it was almost impossible for CSO representatives to even meet with high-ranking 
state officials (Interviewee 14).  
5.2. Clarity and predictability of the policy-making process  
While basic provisions ensuring transparency of the policy-making are an essential pre-condition 
for facilitating the inclusion of CSOs in the decision-making process, they are not a sufficient 
guarantee that a dialogue would be established effectively on the practical level. The quality of the 
legislative process as manifested in the presence of clear, predictable and effective legislative 
procedures, which are respected, is also an important aspect of the establishment of a successful 
state-CSO dialogue.  In this respect, Ukraine's performance has been more ambiguous and issues 
of clarity and predictability exist within both key branches, relevant to the law-making process, 
namely the executive and the legislature.  
When it comes to the Parliament, criticism of the quality of the law-making process has been linked 
to the fact it is seen as "too Soviet" (Lovitt 2016b) as well as overly chaotic and lacking reliable 
procedures (Zaslavskyi 2017: 2). The reason for this is the lack of long-term planning and 
coordination of legislative activities as well as the common practice of violating formal procedures. 
This is well-exemplified by the fact that unscheduled legislative initiatives, whose presence on the 
agenda is "difficult to determine", are a common occurrence as is the lack of "sequence of passing 
legislation", which often results in unplanned activities being voted on before laws that were 
submitted much earlier (Ibid.: 5). Similarly, there is a distinct tendency towards passing laws at the 
first reading, as opposed to the customary second, which could limit legislative scrutiny (ibid.: 6). 
The view of the legislative process as unclear was reinforced by the perceptions of one of the 
experts interviewed, who possessed legal expertise (Interviewee 3). He suggested that CSO 
participation is considerably hindered by the unpredictability of the law-making process, in which 
official procedures are often disrespected leading to new initiatives and amendments appearing in 
Parliament without prior notice. Similarly, another interviewee suggested that the practice of 
controversial drafts appearing apparently out of nowhere has intensified significantly in the anti-
corruption sector in particular (Interviewee 9). 
Furthermore, the presence of overly high thresholds for the passing and adoption of legislation 
hinders effective legislative activity (European Parliament 2017: 10). The relevance of this issue to 
productive state-CSO dialogue and successful CSO advocacy was demonstrated by one of the 
interviewees, who highlighted the fact that despite fruitful dialogue with MPs, many CSO proposals 
are not incorporated into laws due to the high requirements for support as well as the common 
problem of lack of quorum, as was the case with some initiatives aimed to address the introduction 
of e-declarations for activists (Interviewee 10). This means that CSO representatives and even MPs 
could have very little control over the legislative process even in cases where productive dialogue 
and consultations do take place.  
The lack of streamlined and predictable procedures in the Rada is further exacerbated by the fact 
that the executive branch and especially the Presidential Administration has managed to 
considerably increase its de facto influence on public policy-making despite formal constitutional 
power balance between institutions (Sushko 2015: 1; Zaslavskyi 2017: 3). The shift has created 
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uncertainty about the real centre of policy-making, bringing informal channels of influence on 
public policy to the forefront and undermining formal procedure. The consequences of this are 
well-demonstrated by the comments of one interviewee, who suggested the consolidation of 
presidential power has resulted in greater presidential control over individual MPs and the 
Parliament as a whole, thus allowing the executive to influence legislative activities and outcomes 
through informal networks (Interviewee 14). This naturally has negative implications for the clarity 
and predictability of legislative agenda and outcomes.  
5.3. Preliminary conclusions  
Overall, it could be concluded that Ukraine's legislative process is characterised by commitment to 
transparency and public access to information, which is associated with the state-CSO relationship 
categories at the higher end of the spectrum of state openness presented in the previous chapter. 
Access to information relevant to the legislative process is guaranteed by law as well as through 
the presence of intense informal communication and information exchange between relevant 
political actors and CSO representatives. Importantly, there is a clear trend towards improved 
transparency and access to information since 2014, which is confirmed by testimonies of activists 
as well as by the literature more generally.  
Whilst levels of transparency correspond with those found in political systems more open to 
participatory governance, civic participation is somewhat limited by the relatively chaotic and 
unpredictable nature of legislative agenda and the law-making process. Although such weaknesses 
of the legislative process are largely a result of limited institutional capacities (Zaslavskyi 2017: 2) 
they have the potential to restrict the ability of CSO representatives to participate in public policy-
making in a meaningful way.  
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6. Legal Framework for Engagement  
In line with the analytical framework employed in this thesis, this chapter will seek to provide an 
overview of the most important legal and institutional channels for dialogue between state and 
civil society, which exist in Ukraine.  
Before moving on to the substantive part of this chapter, however, an important caveat needs to 
be made. While the author has made an effort to provide a reasonably comprehensive overview of 
Ukraine’s legislative provisions linked to civil society participation in decision-making, the aim of 
this thesis is not the development of an exhaustive legal review. Instead, this chapter will focus on 
the platforms, which are deemed most relevant to the research topic and which are perceived to 
have the most significant consequence for CSOs’ inclusion or exclusion from the governance 
process. This set of legislative provisions have been selected as it is believed that they are 
informative when it comes to the state’s perception of the role of civil society organisations in 
policy-making.  
In addition, it is acknowledged that the framework, which will be discussed, is not limited to the 
anti-corruption sector and governs public participation in decision-making more generally. Given 
the salience of anti-corruption policy-making and reform in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and 
the scale of civil society advocacy in this particular policy area, however, these forums have been 
very relevant to state-CSO dialogue on anti-corruption.  
Overall, the replacement of Viktor Yanukovych’s corrupt authoritarian regime in 2014 gave a new 
impetus to the discussion on participatory governance and civic engagement in Ukraine. As a result, 
the post-Euromaidan period has seen considerably vocal public commitment to opening up political 
process to non-state actors (Council of Europe 2014: 1). This process has been driven by significant 
pressure as well as practical assistance by donors and international actors such as the European 
Union and the Council of Europe, who have incorporated provisions demanding the establishment 
of more inclusive policy practices in a number of action plans and developmental strategies for 
Ukraine (see Council of Europe 2014; European External Action Service 2014). Public authorities at 
the highest level have recognised the importance of institutional openness in a number of national 
strategies including within the country’s new Action Plan in the framework of the Open 
Government Partnership initiative (Open Government Partnership 2015) as well as the most recent 
Action Plan for implementation of the National Strategy on the Development of Civil Society for 
2016–2020 (President of Ukraine 2016).  
In order to understand the current dynamics of state-CSO participation and to evaluate the degree 
to which overly optimistic expectations about institutional openness have indeed been justified, it 
is necessary to look at the current institutional and legal framework, which has been established in 
order to facilitate such dialogue. 
6.1. Citizen appeals  
Perhaps the oldest form of civic influence on political processes in Ukraine is the citizen’s appeal. 
According to the Law on Citizens’ Appeals, which was adopted on 2 October 1996 (Law of Ukraine 
1996) every Ukrainian citizen is given the right to appeal directly to a number of public authorities 
and institutions. Such appeals can take various forms including recommendations on public 
policies, expression of opinion on existing or drafted legislation or an appeal against decisions 
made by the state. Such appeals and petitions can be submitted verbally, orally or since the most 
recent amendment in 2015, electronically. Upon submission, the authorities have the obligation to 
respond within two weeks.  
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Although this form of interaction between the state and society at large appears to be the most 
common, the tool has largely been seen as ineffective in providing a meaningful mechanism for 
engagement and dialogue (Kobets and Ruda 2014: 38). The main reason for this has been the lack 
of strict guidelines or requirements for the format of such appeals, which often makes them a weak 
form of interaction with governing structures. In addition, although public institutions have the 
obligation to provide a formal response, appeals are largely irrelevant to the actual decision-making 
process since civil servants are not obliged to take them into consideration in the process of policy 
development or to provide any justification for ignoring them. Overall, given its limitations, the 
citizen appeals mechanism provides a weak tool for state-CSO interaction and meaningful policy 
dialogue. 
6.2. Public expertise  
The possibility for CSOs to provide public expertise is another mechanism allowing for civic input in 
governance. The procedure was first introduced in the Ukrainian legal framework in 2008 after the 
adoption of Decree No.976 by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers (Law of Ukraine, 2008). In short, 
public expertise is a mechanism, which can be initiated by CSOs interested in cooperating with state 
authorities on the preparation of policy documents or the monitoring and evaluation of existing 
legislation and other aspects of state activity. In the process, a number of “expert proposals” are 
developed for the consideration of the state body in question. The head of the relevant public body 
is then obliged to provide a response to the recommendations and the further steps, which might 
be undertaken in order to address these recommendations.  
Overall, while in theory this mechanism provides a meaningful channel of communication and 
facilitates state-civil society interaction, it has failed to boost the influence of CSOs in the state 
decision-making process and in governance more generally. Admittedly, in the post-Euromaidan 
period the use of the public expertise mechanism has become more common in comparison to the 
first few years of its introduction (see for example Yuridicheskya Praktika 2018), when the tool 
remained unpopular and was rarely utilised (Kobets and Ruda 2014: 37). However, given that the 
current legislative framework mandates that state bodies respond to expert recommendations but 
does not include an obligation to take those into consideration during decision-making, this 
mechanism is limited in its capacity to boost CSO participation in the policy-making process and has 
remained relatively marginal. 
6.3. Public consultations  
Public consultations are by far the most notable form of inclusion of CSO representatives in public 
policy-making in Ukraine. The concept of public consultations as a part of policy-making was first 
introduced in 2010 with Resolution No. 996 of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers “On Guaranteeing 
the Participation of the Public in Public Policy formation” (Law of Ukraine 2010), whose aim was to 
guarantee wider involvement of the public and relevant stakeholders in the process of policy 
development and implementation. Although the regulation does mandate the preparation and 
approval of annual plans for public consultations by executive bodies both nationally and locally, 
the existing legal framework has a number of notable limitations. First of all, the regulation does 
not apply to the Presidential Administration or the Parliament, which automatically limits its utility 
as a comprehensive mechanism for political dialogue with CSOs. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
authorities are obliged to publish information about the outcomes of public consultations within 
two weeks of their finalisation, this provision has often been overlooked and authorities are said to 
have provided such feedback in no more than 30% of the cases even after the Euromaidan (Lovitt 
2016b: 271).  
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What is more, at present consultations are only mandatory in a very limited set of cases including 
on all drafts of economic regulations and bills linked to nuclear energy or the environment (Lovitt 
2016b: 269). The reason for this is that these cases are governed by additional legislation such as 
the Law “On the Principles of State Regulatory Policy in Economic Activity” from September 2003, 
which mandates consultations as a compulsory pre-condition for the validity of any regulatory acts 
(Law of Ukraine 2003). In the vast majority of cases, however, the state of current legislation means 
that public consultations have a purely advisory, non-binding and voluntary character and state 
representatives have no formal obligation to carry them out, to consider proposals given in this 
framework or to justify their decision not to take them into consideration (Council of Europe 2014: 
3). On a more practical note, there is also no clearly set or transparent procedure for the selection 
of CSO representatives, who take part in such consultations when they are carried out (Lovitt 
2016a: 95).  
More recently, in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and under Ukraine’s commitments in the 
framework of the Open Government Initiative, the practice of public consultations was revitalised 
and evolved considerably (Council of Europe 2017b). This fact was highlighted also by interviewees 
who praised authorities’ commitment to genuine consultation in draft development in the early 
years after the 2014 Revolution (Interviewees 2, 4, 5). Some regularly quoted examples from the 
anti-corruption field of bills developed with a high degree of consultation and participation by CSOs 
were the Laws on National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), On the Fight Against 
Corruption and On Asset Management as well as various amendments to the Criminal Code and the 
legislation needed for the creation of the National Agency for Corruption Prevention (NACP) 
(Interviewees 1, 5, 9). The lack of legal obligation to actually carry out such consultations by most 
institutions, however, was said to considerably constrain the utility of the general consultation 
provision.   
In view of these deficiencies, a number of attempts have been made throughout Ukraine’s modern 
history to adopt a comprehensive Law on Public Consultations. Drafts bills were developed in 2004 
and 2010 but they failed to materialise into viable legislation (Lovitt 2016b: 311). The seemingly 
increased openness to cooperation notwithstanding, legislative framework providing for political 
dialogue has continued to lag behind even in the aftermath of the Euromaidan. In 2016 and 2017 an 
attempt was made for the development of a new law, which would have made consultations an 
integral and mandatory part of policy-making process in most fields including anti-corruption (Ash 
et al. 2017: 68). Despite initial positive signs, such as extensive cooperation with civil society on the 
preparation of the draft (Open Government Partnership 2018: 29) and a positive evaluation by the 
OSCE (2017), the bill failed to move further after it was submitted to Parliament and the reason for 
this appeared to be internal political obstruction (Ash et al. 2017: 68). CSO representatives also 
identified the absence of comprehensive Law on Consultations as one of the most substantial 
problems of the current legislative framework for engagement in Ukraine (Interviewee 5).  
6.4. Public councils  
Public councils represent a particular form of consultation and are the most notable aspect of the 
current Ukrainian framework for engaging CSO representatives in the decision-making process on 
national and local level. As such they deserve special attention. The public council as an advisory 
mechanism providing a channel for dialogue between CSO representatives and the state was first 
introduced in the 1990s and was subsequently reformed twice in order to tackle a number of 
weaknesses. Public councils’ operation in its current form is based on Resolution No. 996 of the 
Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers from November 2010 (Law of Ukraine 2010), which requires all public 
bodies to establish a permanent consultative body (a public council) staffed with CSO 
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representatives. These organs are elected for a period of two years and are tasked with ensuring 
that the relevant body considers public input in its decision-making process.  
The presence of legislative basis for the creation of such permanent advisory bodies is admittedly 
a notable sign of official commitment to dialogue and participatory policy-making. However, the 
recommendatory character of the opinions of public councils has often limited their impact on 
policy as in times of deficient political will their proposals have simply been ignored by state 
representatives behind the façade of public engagement (Ghosh 2014: 3). Furthermore, the lack of 
integration of council opinions in the wider policy-making process has often allowed for their 
marginalisation by unwilling political actors. These deficiencies in the legislative framework as well 
as the low cost of non-compliance and sabotage have meant that despite the long history of public 
consultation in this form, councils have had questionable success in facilitating inclusion of civil 
society in public governance. A good illustration of the imperfect framework for their creation and 
operation is their successful marginalisation in the pre-2014 period more generally and their 
complete irrelevance during the term of former President Victor Yanukovych. Given the lack of any 
legal procedure for staffing the councils, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, incorporated 
a number of religious organisations but no representatives from think tanks with specialisation in 
foreign policy or other relevant organisations (Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group 2013).  
6.5. Preliminary conclusions  
Overall, Ukraine’s legal framework features some important provisions guaranteeing CSO 
involvement and participation in the public policy-making process. There are some key weaknesses 
such as the non-binding character of most types of civic recommendations and opinions expressed 
within the outlined mechanisms, the lack of obligation for authorities to engage civil society on a 
regular basis and the lack of a comprehensive Law on Public Consultations. Such limitations 
admittedly leave the use of many of these mechanisms in good faith to the discretion of the 
authorities. Regardless of this, however, the current legal framework for civic participation in 
governance is relatively comprehensive and offers a basis for policy dialogue, which could be 
associated with the legal guarantees characteristic of Limited dialogue as a category of state-CSO 
relations according to the state’s degree of openness. This view of the legal framework as 
acceptably comprehensive was reinforced by CSO experts as well. 
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7. Degree of institutionalisation of dialogue  
As outlined in the framework, the de facto degree of formalisation of state-CSO dialogue and the 
institutionalisation of reliable, consistent and effective channels for consultation with CSO 
representatives is the final and perhaps most important indicator of the degree of a system’s 
openness to CSO participation in policy-making.  
7.1. Legal framework in practice  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Ukraine’s legislative framework for CSO engagement, 
while having some limitations, provides for the presence of at least one notable form of 
institutionalised dialogue, namely pubic consultations and public councils. While the design 
limitations of some more minor legislative mechanisms such as the appeals system and the public 
expertise procedure have largely deemed them marginal as institutionalised forms of state-CSO 
dialogue, in theory, provisions on consultation through public councils appear to represent a 
meaningful commitment to formalising CSO participation in public policy-making. 
In practice, however, these councils have remained a considerable source of controversy 
throughout their existence. Their actual effectiveness has often been questioned by experts, who 
have seen them as “Potemkin village” organs (Smagliy 2017), a “tick-the-box mechanism” 
(European External Action Service 2014: 4) and even a “theatre of absurd” (Kharkiv Human Rights 
Protection Group 2013). The reason for this has been the well-recognised tendency of the 
authorities to marginalise such bodies and undermine their real effectiveness and impact through 
a number of disruptive strategies including the exclusion of relevant but critical CSOs from these 
structures or even their staffing with representatives from politically controlled organisations 
created in order to mimic dialogue (Ghosh 2014: 3). 
Considering the poor performance of public councils as a tool for CSO engagement until 2014, the 
revitalisation of these bodies became a top priority of the post-Euromaidan government and civil 
society. Councils were largely re-staffed and restructured in order to turn them into an effective 
platform for dialogue.  Despite this, however, the majority of the activists interviewed for this thesis 
remained sceptical about the degree to which public councils provide a reliable and sufficiently 
institutionalised form of dialogue (Interviewees 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12). According to them, many 
councils remain tokenistic and irrelevant as their effectiveness varies considerably based on a 
number of subjective factors such as political will within the institution in question or leadership 
preferences (Interviewees 2, 4, 9). The most commonly cited illustration of this was the presence 
of highly efficient councils such as those attached to NABU (e.g. Interviewees 2, 4, 5) or the Asset 
Recovery and Management Agency (Interviewee 5), which exercise significant real influence in the 
decision-making process, on one hand, and the marginalisation of similar structures in less “open” 
institutions such as the NACP (Interviewees 5, 7), the National Security Service or the General 
Prosecutor’s Office (Interviewee 4), on the other.  
Notably, most interviewees tended to point at a general trend towards declining willingness for 
cooperation with councils and with CSOs as a whole since 2016, which was said to be in contrast to 
relatively higher responsiveness to input in the early days after the Revolution (Interviewees 1, 2, 5, 
6, 8, 11, 13, 14). In line with popular opinions about the “illiberal turn” of the current Presidential 
Administration (Umland 2017; Haluska 2017), the authorities were said to have increasingly adopted 
an overly formalistic approach in handling council recommendations and opinions, provided in the 
course of consultations. As a consequence, certain procedures and mechanisms for participation 
were said to have considerably declined in effectiveness and to have stopped providing a reliable 
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channel for communication with authorities (Interviewees 1, 6). A telling example of the declining 
responsiveness to input provided through official channels for consultation is the fact that while in 
2014 and 2015 CSO input was often directly integrated into the new laws On NABU, On Corruption 
Prevention, On Asset Management and a number of other pieces of legislation related to the 
creation of NACP, more recently, the same mechanisms have proved much less fruitful in ensuring 
civic inclusion in public policy-making. As pointed out by one of the interviewees, the draft law On 
the Anti-Corruption Court prepared by CSO experts was largely ignored more recently, although it 
was developed using a similar consultative approach as earlier (Interviewee 1).  
In this context, the trend towards selectiveness and significant fluctuation in the effectiveness of 
consultations more generally was also said by interviewees to have become more prominent 
(Interviewees 1, 5, 6, 8, 11). This means that while in certain institutions such as the Ministry of 
Health, the Ministry of Education or the Asset Recovery and Management Agency, institutionalised 
consultative channels have continued to provide a reliable basis for dialogue with policy-makers, in 
others such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Presidential Administration, those same 
channels have become devoid of purpose (Interviewees 5, 7, 9, 14). What is more, even within the 
same institutions response to dialogue with CSO representatives was said to vary considerably 
depending on the type of issue at hand or, more often, on the type of recommendation issues by 
civil society experts (Interviewee 5). A good illustration of this was offered by one of the 
interviewees, who recalled his recent participation in a consultation initiated by the Presidential 
Administration prior to the creation of the National Office of Financial Security. According to the 
interviewee, although the platform appeared to have started as a genuine attempt to include CSOs 
in policy-making, it was quickly terminated after CSOs expressed strong criticism towards the 
Administration’s plans (Interviewee 1).  
7.2. Additional institutional developments 
In addition to the mechanisms outlined in Ukraine’s legislation, a number of formal platforms for 
engagement were set up in the aftermath of the Euromaidan to respond to the increased demand 
for participatory policy-making and public stake in the reform process. These have included the 
establishment of commissions staffed by civil society representatives, tasked with aiding the 
process of staff selection for a number of institutions, including the new anti-corruption bodies 
NABU and NACP as well as the judiciary (USAID 2016: 46; Ash et al. 2017: 64). Similarly, shortly after 
the Euromaidan the National Reform Council was set up to serve as a “policy dialogue platform” 
(Sushko 2015: 3) bringing together CSO experts and government representatives including the 
President, the Prime Minister, Ministers and chairs of parliamentary committees. The Civil Society 
Coordination Council and the Reform Support Centre were also set up and tasked with assisting 
the government in the drafting and implementation of reform legislation (Sushko and Prystayko 
2016: 7). Furthermore, regular CSO participation became a common practice in most parliamentary 
committees (Krasynska and Martin 2016: 321) and in a number of lower-profile platforms such the 
Council of Anti-Corruption Fighters in the Parliament and regular consultative forums bringing CSO 
representatives and law-makers together were set up.  These initial institutional developments 
were acknowledged and praised by interviewees, who suggested that 2014 saw real commitment 
to inclusion of CSOs in policy-making for the first time in Ukraine’s history (Interviewees 5, 8).   
The establishment of a multitude of formal mechanisms for civic participation certainly points at a 
considerable commitment to providing a consistent and reliable institutional framework for 
engaging civil society in policy-making. A look at the de facto operation of such formal channels of 
communication, however, raises questions about the degree to which they can be regarded as 
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reliable indicators of increased state openness to CSO input. Not only were they said by 
interviewees to have been of varying success and effectiveness, but more recently, many of these 
apparently institutionalised forums were said to have become increasingly ineffective in practice. 
Selection committees within the judiciary as well as the NACP have come under political pressure 
and have failed to ensure public control over the selection process in the long-run (Shevchenko 
2017; Interviewees 3, 12).  
In addition, the National Reform Council, which was praised for its activity until 2015 (Sushko 2015: 
3), has also come under increasing pressure after CSO representatives were replaced by politically 
controlled figures loyal to President Poroshenko such as Iryna Lutsenko, the wife of the 
controversial Ukrainian Prosecutor General, Yuriy Lutsenko (Smagliy 2015). Similarly, one of the 
interviewees recalled his experience within the National Council for Anti-Corruption Policy, pointing 
out that earlier enthusiasm and productive communication with CSOs gradually faded during the 
course of existence of the body and meetings became rarer, while CSO recommendations became 
increasingly overlooked (Interviewee 11). The Civil Society Coordination Council has also become 
subject to great criticism after it failed to respond to a number of assaults on civil society in Ukraine 
such as the highly controversial legislative plans to introduce mandatory e-declarations for anti-
corruption activists. Its apparent disengagement from the decision-making process has been seen 
by some as proof of its political dependence and weakening commitment to promoting 
participatory governance (Smagliy 2015).  
Interviewees also highlighted an increasingly difficult although ongoing interaction with 
Parliament, with the most common example cited being the deteriorating relationship with the 
anti-corruption committee within the legislature, a previously productive platform (Interviewees 2, 
6, 7, 8). The break in relations, which was widely perceived to be a result of the replacement of the 
previous sympathetic chair of the Committee, was seen by interviewees as a particularly strong 
manifestation of the primary importance of leadership preferences as opposed to institutionalised 
practices in ensuring CSO participation in the policy process (Interviewees 7, 8). Despite the 
apparent continuation of civic participation in committee meetings, the responsiveness to CSO 
input was said to have dramatically declined in practice (Interviewees 2, 6).  
The manifest decline in success and effectiveness of apparently formalised mechanisms for 
participatory governance is said to have resulted, on one hand, in the rise of outsider tactics such 
as protests and litigation, which challenge state policy decisions and stand in contrast to 
participatory governance (Interviewee 2). On the other hand, the deterioration of formal 
cooperation was said to have contributed to the revitalisation of informal channels of 
communication and their establishment as a primary tool for productive cooperation with the 
authorities in many institutions where genuine political will is lacking (Interviewees 1, 2, 4, 7). 
Although some CSO representatives suggested that their informal communication with state 
representatives is also becoming increasingly difficult (Interviewee 2), the prevailing opinion was 
that such non-institutionalised channels remain the sole reliable mechanism for influencing public 
policy in a meaningful way (Interviewees 1, 2, 4, 6). A good example is the relatively productive 
relationship established between CSOs and the Anti-Monopoly Committee, which was said to be 
based on the good interpersonal relations between state officials in the institution and CSO 
representatives, which facilitated communication and institutional openness to civic participation 
(Interviewee 4). 
In addition to ensuring responsiveness, reform champions and informal connections were said to 
have become increasingly important in securing access to relevant decision-makers. This is well-
illustrated by the practice of private consultation with CSO experts, which was said to have become 
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a common initiative of the Ministry of Health due to the presence of good interpersonal relations 
between officials and CSO experts in the field (Interviewee 14). Similarly, in Parliament informal 
links with reform-minded MPs were said to be crucial for advancing certain policies in an 
atmosphere of increasing marginalisation of CSO representatives in formal discussion forums such 
as committee hearings (Interviewee 2). The fact that such informal dialogue often fails to translate 
into policy-decisions due to strong party discipline (Interviewee 4), however, points at the 
vulnerability of such informal channels for civic participation as a basis for inclusive governance.  
7.3. Preliminary conclusions 
Overall, the above analysis points at the considerable push towards institutionalisation of policy 
dialogue in Ukraine since 2014, evident from the creation of a number of formal platforms for state-
CSO policy cooperation. A closer look at the de facto functioning of these formal mechanisms four 
years after the Euromaidan, however, suggests that many of them have failed to establish 
themselves as reliable and consistent channels for CSO input, governed by formal rules of 
procedures. As a result, dialogue remains de facto fully controlled by the government and subject 
to political will in the vast majority of cases. The relative ease with which formal mechanisms for 
civic participation have been marginalised by state authorities more recently, suggests that 
subjective and contextual factors remain primary in determining the extent of dialogue's 
effectiveness   
The experience of practitioners apparently points at the declining relevance of formal structures 
for participation and their replacement with informal and much less resilient mechanisms for 
participation and CSO input, which, while often efficient, are more vulnerable to systemic instability 
and shifts in the political context. Furthermore, the use of informal channels for ensuring the 
functioning and effectiveness of formalised platforms and for gaining access to decision-makers 
points at a peculiar trend towards informalisation of institutionalised dialogue. All of this suggests 
that current levels of institutionalisation of participatory policy-making remain low and correspond 
at best with State-Controlled Engagement on the spectrum of state-CSO relationship types 
presented in this thesis. This does not necessarily fully reflect common perceptions of Ukrainian 
authorities' dramatic openness to public governance. Finally, the vast variations between the 
receptiveness and openness of different institutions suggest the overall openness of the system as 
a whole is difficult to establish with certainty and remains volatile.  
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8. Findings and conclusion  
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the public policy-making process in Ukraine 
has become more open to the inclusion and participation of civil society representatives in the 
aftermath of the Euromaidan in 2014. In order to answer the research question, the Ukrainian 
legislative framework for institutional transparency and civic engagement as well as the practical 
dimensions of state-CSO cooperation were examined in detail. The analysis pointed at a number of 
notable trends and provided valuable insights.  
When considering the conceptual framework developed in this thesis, post-2014 Ukraine 
represents a peculiar case study. On one hand, the decision-making process boosts a considerable 
degree of transparency and some meaningful, although limited, degree of clarity and predictability, 
allowing for nearly unobstructed public access to information, which is expected in highly open 
political systems. Similarly, the country’s legal framework for engagement of civil society actors, 
while missing key elements such as a Law on Public Consultations or provisions for mandatory civic 
participation, represents a relatively comprehensive attempt at ensuring that civil society 
representatives and the public at large are included in the deliberative process. As a result, 
according to these two indicators, Ukraine’s degree of openness apparently places the country in 
the higher part of the spectrum of institutional openness and likely in the Limited Dialogue 
category.  
The exploration of the policy dialogue in practice through the prism of activists’ experience, 
however, paints a more nuanced picture. Although in the initial stages after the Euromaidan there 
was a clear push towards the introduction of more formal channels for state-CSO dialogue and the 
incorporation of CSO representatives in the institutionalised policy-making process recent 
developments suggest that institutionalisation in the sense of firmly embedding the spirit of 
participatory governance in public policy-making has not taken place yet. Interestingly, the 
Ukrainian experience also suggests that low levels of institutionalisation do not necessarily mean 
more limited civil society engagement. This is well-demonstrated by the fact that in the first two 
years after the Euromaidan the low degree of institutionalisation appears to have contributed to a 
much more intensive state-CSO interaction and civil society inclusion than the one expected based 
on the formal framework at the time. More recently, however, the varying performance of some 
formal mechanisms and the gradual undermining and marginalisation of others suggest that they 
have failed to established themselves as strong or reliable enough as to represent a solid basis for 
continuous CSO inclusion over a prolonged period of time. Instead, dialogue and state 
responsiveness remain largely dependent on informal channels of communication, interpersonal 
connections and the presence of favourable contextual factors such as sympathetic leadership.  
The increasingly negative experience of CSO representatives in their interaction with state officials 
and their participation in the policy process and the ongoing marginalisation of formal channels for 
dialogue suggest that, according to this final indicator, the de facto openness of the political system 
is considerably lagging behind expectations. The apparent lack of sustainability of policy dialogue 
points at a level of openness much lower than this indicated by the state’s performance according 
to the two other factors. Such discrepancies make the overall qualification of state-CSO relations 
according to the model problematic. The task of conclusively determining the position of the 
Ukrainian political system as whole on the spectrum of state-CSO relations is further complicated 
by the emerging vast differences in civic participation across various state authorities and organs 
as well as across specific policies. 
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Overall, as pointed out in the methodology chapter the model has been useful in illustrating the 
fluctuation in the intensity of civic participation and in identifying general trends of change 
between different periods in Ukraine’s history. Its direct application to empirical realities, however, 
is naturally imperfect and of only limited explanatory utility.  
Undoubtedly, the political process has become considerably more open to dialogue and civic 
participation since 2014. The increased institutional openness and state receptiveness to CSO 
recommendations, is demonstrated by both the testimonies of anti-corruption activists, directly 
involved in advocacy activities, and by the wider literature and the analysis of the formal 
arrangements in place. The stark contrast is especially clear when comparisons are drawn with the 
authoritarian approaches used by the regime established by Victor Yanukovych. Recent examples 
of backsliding and increasing marginalisation of CSO representatives by a number of state bodies, 
however, suggest that it is too early to speak of an effectively established system of participatory 
government. In fact, the formalisation of institutional openness and civic engagement appears to 
pose the most significant challenge to a long-term shift towards governance.  
With this in mind, further research is needed in order for longer-term conclusions and trends to be 
identified as currently the situation remains unstable and its future development is difficult to 
predict. This is especially true in view of the approaching 2019 elections round including a 
presidential election, in which current President Poroshenko’s re-election is less than certain 
(Iwański 2018). Furthermore, while the present study does serve as a good departure point and 
identifies important systemic trends, its exclusive focus on anti-corruption and CSOs operating on 
the national-level make generalisations about the political system at large limited. Further academic 
research looking at a wider spectrum of policy areas and incorporating local-level civil society 
organisations as well as less structured activism is needed for a fully comprehensive understanding 
of the topic to be developed and for the wider validity of the present conclusions to be determined. 
Finally, although direct policy advocacy represents a key aspect of civil society’s input into the 
political process, civic policy impact is not limited to it. An exploration of other, more indirect ways 
in which CSOs and the wider public can influence political outcomes would be highly informative in 
the wider context of public governance debates in Ukraine. 
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Appendix: List of Interviewees’ Affiliations 
 
1. Advisor to the General Council of State Watch Ukraine  
2. Representative from Reanimation Package of Reform Secretariat, anti-corruption 
programme  
3. Member of the Public Integrity Council and the Public Civic Control by the National Anti-
Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 
4. Senior representative of the Anti-Corruption Headquarters  
5. Anti-corruption policy expert from Transparency International Ukraine  
6. Senior representative of the Civic Lustration Committee  
7. Senior representative of the Anti-Corruption Action Center  
8. Representative of Board of Transparency International Ukraine  
9. Anti-corruption expert from Engage Ukraine project, executed by PACT (international 
organisation) 
10. Representative from Center Eidos  
11. Legal expert from Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine and member of the Center for Policy 
and Legal Reform  
12. Senior representative of the Center for Democracy and Rule of Law  
13. Expert from the Anti-Corruption Reform Group by the Reanimation Package of Reform  
14. Representative from Reanimation Package of Reform Secretariat, regional outreach 
programme  
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